As the Confederates who broke through the III Corps‘ line pushed across the open fields toward Cemetery Ridge, a huge hole had opened up on the right flank of the II Corps. Troops from the III Corps were fleeing to the rear through this hole, and a Confederate brigade under the command of Brig. General Cadmus Wilcox was right behind them.

Maj. General Hancock was desperate to plug the gap. He looked around for a unit – any unit – that could delay the Confederate advance long enough to form a defensive line. The only men he could find were 8 companies of the 1st Minnesota Infantry.

The regiment had been split up to perform different duties across the Union line, and while the bulk of the men were at this point, it wasn’t the whole regiment – only 262 men. Maj. General Hancock rode up to Col. William Colville, pointed at the approaching Confederate brigade of 1,721 men, and said “Colonel, go take those colors!”.

Against worse than 6-to-1 odds, the men of the 1st Minnesota charged down the gentle slope of Cemetery Ridge, 150 years ago right now. After less than 10 minutes of fighting – enough to allow the Union commanders to rally a defensive line behind them – the Minnesotans fell back.

There were only 47 of them left. The 262 men of the 1st Minnesota had taken 215 casualties – an 82% casualty rate. This is the highest percentage of casualties suffered by a surviving unit in American history.

The Confederate attack on the Union left was over.

With the attack against the Union left, most of the troops on Culp’s Hill had been pulled off to reinforce other sectors. Only the brigade of Brig. General George Greene, the oldest general on the field, remained.

Greene’s 1,421 men were as well-prepared as they could be under the circumstances. Brig. General Greene was a West Point-trained engineer who believed in the power of defensive structures. His men had spent the day building small trenches and breastworks – digging in for a potential Confederate attack. It is fortuitous for the Union cause that these were the men who were left on Culp’s Hill.

The Confederates’ original plan for the day involved Lt. General Richard Ewell’s Corps creating a diversion by attacking Culp’s and Cemetery Hills while the main attack was being executed by Lt. General Longstreet on the Union left. This would keep the troops on the Union right occupied so that they couldn’t be used (like they were) to reinforce the left. Ewell was supposed to begin his action as soon as he heard Longstreet’s attack. The combination of Longstreet’s delay in movement, and a phenomenon known as “acoustic shadows“, led to Ewell never getting the signal to go.

Finally, about 150 years ago right now, Ewell started his attack on Culp’s Hill. He was running out of daylight, so the move was risky, but he went ahead with it anyway. Greene’s small brigade would face off against almost a full division – 3 brigades of Confederate infantry. They were outnumbered more than 3-to-1.

The breastworks proved to be a big advantage for the Yankees. Because of those, Greene was able to hold the crest of the hill. Despite a few assorted reinforcements, from other brigades coming to their aide, the Federals lost control of the southern, lower portion of Culp’s Hill.

In two hours of combat, the Confederates had beaten back their adversaries, but couldn’t totally push them off. If the Confederates had properly scouted the area, they’d have known that the Baltimore Pike – the main supply line for the Union army – was within easy striking distance of their new position. With that intelligence, they could have caused serious problems for General Meade. As it was, they were content to hold their newly-gained position.

It was only a matter of time before the battle would reach Sickles’ salient at the Peach Orchard. The main weakness of a salient is that it can be attacked from two sides. That’s just what’s about the happen.

150 years ago right now, the division of Maj. General Lafayette McLaws – especially the brigades of Brig. General Joseph Kershaw and Brig. General William Barksdale – will come across the Emmitsburg Road, and strike the men of Brig. General Charles Graham. Within an hour of the first contact, the Union troops occupying the exposed position will be forced to withdraw in a somewhat less-than-organized fashion. The rest of Brig. General Andrew Humphreys’ division, holding the line going north along the Emmitsburg Road, will have to abandon their position a little after 7:00pm, too.

For the moment anyway, the Confederates will have a clear route to the Union rear. They’ll soon be within range to flank the II Corps. Someone on the Union side needs to take control here.

Around this time 150 years ago, as Maj. General Daniel Sickles surveyed his line at the Peach Orchard from his headquarters at the Trostle Farm, his leg felt strange. When he bent over to feel into his boot, he sensed something wet.

Sickles’ leg had been hit by a 12-lb cannon ball, and the lower part of his shin was hanging limp. Despite the story you may have been told, he immediately started to panic. While aides pulled him off his horse and took him around behind the Trostle barn, he begged them not to let him get captured. He was placed in an ambulance and taken to the rear.

Sometime later that night, either at a III Corps field hospital along the Taneytown Road, or at the Daniel Sheaffer Farm, Sickles’ leg was amputated. Knowing that the army medical service was looking for examples of gruesome wounds to use for training material, Sickles used his political influence to have this leg placed in the Army Medical Museum, where he periodically visited it for the rest of his life.

It had been a long day for the men of Brig. General Evander Law’s Alabama brigade.

They awoke very early that morning from their camps just east of Chambersburg, PA and by 3:30am, were marching toward Gettysburg. Because time was of the essence, the men were not allowed to stop for water, and many of them arrived on the battlefield over 12 hours later after Longstreet’s countermarch, with empty canteens. Of course, their work was just beginning.

These men would be tasked with assaulting Little Round Top, but in order to get in to position, they would have to fight their way up Big Round Top, pushing back skirmishers from the 2nd US Sharpshooters the whole way.

Finally, right about now, 150 years ago, the Alabamians were ready to begin their attack up the “back side” of Little Round Top. There to meet them was the brigade of Col. Strong Vincent – the extreme left flank of the Union army.

Of course we all know about the famous 20th Maine Infantry, holding the end of Vincent’s line. Col. Joshua Chamberlain told a very good story, and the actions of his men were brave and worthy of note, but Little Round Top hardly held the key to the Union position. Even if the Confederates making the attack hadn’t been exhausted, they were not at all supported by reinforcements, and there was an entire, fresh Union Corps sitting right behind the hill ready to take it back if needed. For readers interested in the subject, I highly recommend Garry Adelman’s brilliant work, The Myth of Little Round Top.

So after several valiant attempts spanning over 30 minutes of combat, including a few flanking maneuvers, Law’s brigade was ultimately pushed back when the 20th Maine – running low on ammunition themselves – executed a bayonet charge down the hillside, taking many of the Alabamians as prisoners.

The defense of Little Round Top had been successful.

While Benning’s men were attacking Devil’s Den, Brig. General George Anderson’s men engaged Col. Regis de Trobriand’s brigade to the north just about now, 150 years ago. The fighting would spill into the Wheatfield on John Rose’s farm.

Over the next two and a half hours, men from Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Texas (elements of 6 different brigades) would square off against Union troops from three different Corps for control of these normally serene 20 acres. The ground would change hands 6 times. Over 6,000 casualties would be suffered by both sides in the process.

Ultimately, the Wheatfield proved to be a no-man’s land. As the fighting there cooled-down just after 7:30pm, the Confederates controlled the field, but could not advance any farther.

The part of Sickles‘ III Corps line that is farthest to the south is held by the brigade of Brig. General J.H.H. Ward. His left flank is resting on the end of Houck’s Ridge, at a unique rock formation known to locals as “The Devil’s Den“.

There are several stories about how this name came to be. One such story is about a large snake (so large that it was named “The Devil”) that had at one time made the area its home. Snakes aside, the place is full of dark crevices and caves between the rocks, and its size makes it somewhat forboding. You can see it being the kind of place that the Devil himself might feel at-home in.

The name of this place would take on a new meaning with the brutal fighting that would begin there right about now, 150 years ago.

Hood’s division would attack this area, by brigades, “en echelon”. There is some debate as to whether this move was brilliant, or an accident of mis-communication. Essentially, each of Hood’s four brigades would attack one at a time, from right to left along his front. His right-most brigades, commanded by Brig. General Evander Law and Brig. General Jerome Robertson, respectively, would take part in the attack on Little Round Top in a few minutes. His other two brigades, under Brig. General Henry Benning and Brig. General George Anderson, would assault Devil’s Den, and the Wheatfield, respectively.

Because of the way Devil’s Den extends a little farther south than other locations on the field, Ward’s and Benning’s men would start this fight, and it was extremely bloody combat. Within the first few minutes, Hood himself was wounded in the arm, and command of the division fell to Brig. General Law – a fact that led to communication problems and tactical uncertainty on the Confederate side.

The Union men held the good, high ground, but there weren’t enough of them to do it effectively. Capt. Smith, commanding the 4th New York Independent Battery had 4 of his 6 guns on the ridge to provide artillery support, and the other 2 (along with the men of the 4th Maine Infantry) were tucked behind, facing south to blast away at any Confederates attempting a flanking movement around the end of the ridge. Surprisingly, the position held for nearly an hour before being overwhelmed and flanked.

When the Confederates took Devil’s Den, it turned into a platform for sniping at officers on Little Round Top, and they were able to do quite a bit of damage that way, but they couldn’t convert it into further gains. The western slope of Little Round Top proved to be too difficult to assault directly.

It would take Lt. General Longstreet’s Corps over 3 hours to travel the 4 miles between General Lee’s headquarters and the point where their attack would begin. They ended up marching much farther than 4 miles.

Longstreet was not especially excited about his chances for success, so that certainly may have been a factor. The main issue was the lack of a route to the southern end of the field that had been properly scouted.

Taking the most direct route down Seminary Ridge, Longstreet’s men were under the cover of trees and thus concealed from Union eyes. About half-way down though, they came to a clearing that would expose their movement. That obviously couldn’t happen, as the element of surprise was important. Longstreet made the decision to turn his men around and head back up the ridge to the north, cut farther to the west, and hope to find a route behind the ridges that would keep him hidden.

All of this marching and countermarching added a significant amount of time and distance to the move. All of the men, but especially Evander Law’s brigade – who had been marching all day, since about 3:30am – were becoming more fatigued.

By this time, 150 years ago, the two divisions of Longstreet’s Corps that will make the attack today are in position. Within a few minutes, they will step out to confront the over-extended line of Maj. General Dan Sickles’ III Corps.

From Little Round Top, a scared group of Union signalmen, and Maj. General Gouverneur Warren – sent to find a vantage point from which he could see the whole of Sickles’ position – observes the Confederates moving into line of battle to the southwest. Riders are immediately sent out to find someone – anyone – who can occupy that hill.

His long misadventure finally at a close, J.E.B. Stuart arrived at General Lee’s headquarters outside Gettysburg 150 years ago right now.

Though there had been cavalry with Lee during the entire campaign, Stuart took the best of the Confederate cavalrymen with him, leaving the Army of Northern Virginia in a precarious position. He would be chastised by Lee in private, but neither man left a record of the details of the conversation, so we don’t know how stern the talking-to was.

It must not have been too bad, because Stuart maintained his command, though he and his men would be of little use for the rest of the battle.

While Lt. General James Longstreet lost the argument that morning about whether to attempt an attack on the Union left, he at least insisted that the attack wait until all of the men of McLaws’ and Hood’s divisions arrived. The stragglers at the end of the column were the men of Brig. General Evander Law’s Alabama brigade.

150 years ago right now, Law’s men came off the road and were ready for combat. Now, Longstreet could finally start his march to the south, and get his Corps in position for the attack that General Lee wanted.

And the longer Longstreet waits, the more Union troops are coming off the road and strengthening their line.

This thing would be easier said than done.