After a few hours of shelling the town of Carlisle, J.E.B. Stuart got word from General Lee that the main body of the Confederate army was in Gettysburg and had already started fighting.

150 years ago right now, Stuart finally knew where he had to go and got his men on the road toward Gettysburg.

While the main battle has raging all day, Confederate cavalry commander, J.E.B. Stuart kept finding ways to distract himself from the task at hand, namely, finding the rest of the Confederate army.

When he reached the outskirts of York, he found out that, while Lt. General Ewell’s men had been there, they weren’t any longer. They had been ordered to the west, to join up with the rest of the army. Stuart got back on the road to look for them.

Just about now, 150 years ago, the Confederate cavalry arrived at Carlisle expecting to find Ewell’s Corps, but once again, Stuart just missed them. Instead, he found Union militia troops under the command of Brig. General William “Baldy” Smith. Unlike some of the other militia commanders, Smith was determined to defend the town.

Stuart sent a messenger into town demanding surrender. Smith refused. After an hour or so of back-and-forth, Stuart had had enough. He brought up his artillery and shelled Carlisle, causing few injuries and starting several fires in the process.

The Confederates had pushed the Union army out of their defensive position. The Yankees were seemingly fleeing in confusion and panic. The Confederates had seized the initiative. General Lee wanted to exploit that advantage as much as possible.

150 years ago right about now, General Lee sent one of his aides to find General Ewell and ask him to take possession of the high ground on the south end of town – Cemetery and Culp’s Hills. The problem is the way Lee went about asking for this.

Ewell wasn’t used to Lee’s command style. He had been under “Stonewall” Jackson’s command and “Stonewall” kept his subordinates on a tight leash. They got direct, plain, un-ambiguous orders. Lee was more nuanced.

The order Ewell received was to take the heights “if practicable”. Since his men had just marched all the way from Carlisle, fought their way through the XI Corps, and chased the stragglers through town, Ewell decided they had enough. It was also getting late in the day, and he didn’t want to make an attack over un-scouted ground.

In short, rather than pressing forward like Jackson would have done, Ewell came up with a slew of reasons why the attempt wasn’t “practicable”. Lee would have to learn to adjust his style from now on.

As the XI Corps fled in panic through the town of Gettysburg toward the fall-back position on Cemetery Hill, General Howard sent forward one of his reserve brigades to try and hold off the Confederate troops on their heels. The brigade of Col. Charles Coster was chosen for this task.

150 years ago right now, Coster’s small brigade went into position on the north end of town. They were outnumbered at least 2-to-1 as the Confederate brigades of Brig. General Harry Hays and Col. Isaac Avery closed in.

They put up a stiff fight for less than 15 minutes before they too, were forced to withdraw. Half of the brigade became casualties, many of them captured by the Confederates.

One of the casualties was Sgt. Amos Humiston of the 154th New York Infantry who became something of a national celebrity after a photo of his now-fatherless children was found on his then-unidentified body. The photo was reprinted in papers all across the country in what turned out to be a successful effort to identify him. It was one of the touching, human stories of the war.

Union troops are fleeing through the streets of Gettysburg from Seminary Ridge, and the fields north of town. They have been outnumbered and utterly routed. It is this chaotic scene that Maj. General Winfield Scott Hancock rides into right about now, 150 years ago.

Hancock had been sent by General Meade to figure out what was going on, and to take over command of the field if necessary. As I mentioned the other day, Meade’s initial thought was to try and lure the Confederates into a fight along the Pipe Creek Line, and he wanted to stay behind to coordinate that effort should it come to pass. Hancock had seen the ground at Pipe Creek, and was an extremely able commander, so Meade trusted him to go to Gettysburg and examine that ground and make the choice about where the army should fight. It was a tremendous responsibility. Of course we know now that Hancock liked what he saw, and he sent word back to Meade that the rest of the army should move to Gettysburg.

The bigger problem in this instance was General Howard in his role as the overall commander on the field at Gettysburg. While both he and Hancock were Major Generals, Howard had held the rank for a longer period of time, so he was Hancock’s superior – he wasn’t supposed to be taking orders from Hancock. This caused a little bit of a struggle between the two initially, but somehow they were able to work it out. Both men contributed to rallying the troops and creating defensive positions on Cemetery and Culp’s Hills.

It turned out that they were able to take their time with this work because – surprisingly – no further Confederate attacks came that night.

The fighting on Rodes’ front had been going for a few hours with very little to show for it. The Union forces under Brig. General John C. Robinson refused to budge from their position on Seminary Ridge, but the retreat of the XI Corps behind them opened up their right flank and put them at some risk.

150 years ago right now, with the aid of some fresh troops, Maj. General Rodes’ men were finally able to put together a coordinated assault to exploit this weakness. They swept the northern boys from the ridge, and sent them running through town in retreat.

One of the more heroic stories from this part of the battle involves the 16th Maine Infantry, who fought a desperate holding action to cover the retreat of their comrades. They took 241 casualties in the process – almost 81% of their total.

What had started as the withdrawal of the XI Corps from a bad deployment was quickly turning into a disaster for the whole Union army.

Though General Howard arrived a few hours earlier, it took some time for his troops to come off the road in numbers that were large enough to make a difference. While Howard left one division of the XI Corps on Cemetery Hill to form the basis of a fall-back position, the rest were sent north of town to counter the threat from General Ewell’s approaching Confederate Corps.

150 years ago right now, those XI Corps men started forming up. General Schurz’s Division (now under the temporary command of Brig. General Alexander Schimmelfennig) got to the field first, and connected their left with the right of the Union I Corps up on Seminary Ridge, and extended their line to the east, ending at the Carlisle Road. Brig. General Francis Barlow’s Division was responsible for the sector from the Carlisle Road over to the Harrisburg Road.

Barlow had just taken command of the division, and there was bad blood between him and his men. The men of the division saw the young Barlow as a “petty tyrant”. Barlow saw his men as unsoldierly cowards. The XI Corps had a reputation that was earned 2 months before at the Battle of Chancellorsville – the Corps was not well-positioned and was surprised and routed by Jackson’s flank attack. It certainly didn’t help their reputation that the corps was made up of about 50% German immigrants.

With his undersized division in place near the Adams County Almshouse, Barlow surveyed the field in front of him, and saw a small rise that years later would come to be called Barlow’s Knoll. He decided that he needed to hold that little hill, so he moved his division out to it. Making that move meant that he couldn’t effectively cover his whole sector now – his line was stretched too thin.

It didn’t help matters that as soon as he was in position, his division was surprised by the hidden Confederate brigade of Brig. General John Gordon, which had just crossed Rock Creek and started attacking up the hill. It didn’t take much pushing to dislodge the Yankees and send them flying to the rear. Once again, the men of the XI Corps suffered from poor positioning.

When Barlow’s division collapsed, it left Schimmelfennig’s unsupported on it’s right, and thus open to a Confederate flanking maneuver. And that’s exactly what happened. The entire XI Corps line collapsed within the hour, and fled in panic through the town streets – the first of many men to follow.

Now that General Lee has given the OK, Maj. General Henry Heth can move forward and renew his attack against the Union position on McPherson’s ridge. 150 years ago right now, he does just that.

Two of his brigades haven’t yet been engaged: J. Johnston Pettigrew’s and John Brockenbrough’s. These troops – supported on the right by what was left of Archer’s brigade (now under the command of Colonel Birkett Fry), cross Willoughby Run and begin to attack the Union “Iron Brigade“, as well as two other brigades of infantry.

The fighting is fierce, especially between Pettigrew’s men and the “Iron Brigade”. One of Pettigrew’s regiments, the 26th North Carolina Infantry (the largest regiment in either army at Gettysburg), will have a hard time against the 24th Michigan Infantry of the “Iron Brigade” (the largest regiment on the Union side at Gettysburg). When the fighting on McPherson’s Ridge is done, the 800 men of the 26th NC will have suffered 588 casualties, while the 496 men of the 24th MI will take 363 losses – both units lost more than 73% of their number.

The fighting lasted for about 45 minutes. Poor coordination among the Union units, and overwhelming Confederate numbers led to a hasty withdrawal for the U.S. troops to a fall-back position on Seminary Ridge.

That position wouldn’t last much more than half an hour though, due to the fresh division of Maj. General Dorsey Pender joining the assault, and the retreat of the Union troops under Brig. General Robinson on the right flank that we’ll explore further in an upcoming post.

150 years ago right now, General Robert E. Lee finally makes his appearance on the battlefield west of Gettysburg.

Realizing that an attack is already underway from General Ewell’s Corps to the north, Lee gives the go-ahead for General Hill’s Corps – now including the newly-arrived division of Maj. General Dorsey Pender – to renew their attacks against the Union position on McPherson’s Ridge. It wouldn’t take long for them to comply.

The Confederate troops coming in from the north that General Howard was so concerned about were from Lt. General Richard Ewell’s Corps.

The first of these men on the field were Maj. General Robert Rodes‘ Division, arriving 150 years ago right now. They take up a position on Oak Hill, in a perfect place to flank the right side of the Union I Corps‘ line.

Seizing the opportunity, Rodes orders his men to attack, but his subordinates don’t coordinate their movements with each other. Two of the brigade commanders – Iverson and O’Neal – don’t even bother to lead their men, and the assault is repulsed. Iverson’s brigade is pretty thoroughly destroyed in the process, and the area where his men are slaughtered is now know as “Iverson’s Pits” and is one of the areas of the Gettysburg battlefield that is said to be haunted.

For the next several hours, the Confederates will send multiple attacks at the Union position on Seminary Ridge without success. It isn’t until General Lee arrives and the attacks become coordinated and well-supported that the tide turns for the southerners.