Around this time 150 years ago, as Maj. General Daniel Sickles surveyed his line at the Peach Orchard from his headquarters at the Trostle Farm, his leg felt strange. When he bent over to feel into his boot, he sensed something wet.

Sickles’ leg had been hit by a 12-lb cannon ball, and the lower part of his shin was hanging limp. Despite the story you may have been told, he immediately started to panic. While aides pulled him off his horse and took him around behind the Trostle barn, he begged them not to let him get captured. He was placed in an ambulance and taken to the rear.

Sometime later that night, either at a III Corps field hospital along the Taneytown Road, or at the Daniel Sheaffer Farm, Sickles’ leg was amputated. Knowing that the army medical service was looking for examples of gruesome wounds to use for training material, Sickles used his political influence to have this leg placed in the Army Medical Museum, where he periodically visited it for the rest of his life.

It had been a long day for the men of Brig. General Evander Law’s Alabama brigade.

They awoke very early that morning from their camps just east of Chambersburg, PA and by 3:30am, were marching toward Gettysburg. Because time was of the essence, the men were not allowed to stop for water, and many of them arrived on the battlefield over 12 hours later after Longstreet’s countermarch, with empty canteens. Of course, their work was just beginning.

These men would be tasked with assaulting Little Round Top, but in order to get in to position, they would have to fight their way up Big Round Top, pushing back skirmishers from the 2nd US Sharpshooters the whole way.

Finally, right about now, 150 years ago, the Alabamians were ready to begin their attack up the “back side” of Little Round Top. There to meet them was the brigade of Col. Strong Vincent – the extreme left flank of the Union army.

Of course we all know about the famous 20th Maine Infantry, holding the end of Vincent’s line. Col. Joshua Chamberlain told a very good story, and the actions of his men were brave and worthy of note, but Little Round Top hardly held the key to the Union position. Even if the Confederates making the attack hadn’t been exhausted, they were not at all supported by reinforcements, and there was an entire, fresh Union Corps sitting right behind the hill ready to take it back if needed. For readers interested in the subject, I highly recommend Garry Adelman’s brilliant work, The Myth of Little Round Top.

So after several valiant attempts spanning over 30 minutes of combat, including a few flanking maneuvers, Law’s brigade was ultimately pushed back when the 20th Maine – running low on ammunition themselves – executed a bayonet charge down the hillside, taking many of the Alabamians as prisoners.

The defense of Little Round Top had been successful.

While Benning’s men were attacking Devil’s Den, Brig. General George Anderson’s men engaged Col. Regis de Trobriand’s brigade to the north just about now, 150 years ago. The fighting would spill into the Wheatfield on John Rose’s farm.

Over the next two and a half hours, men from Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Texas (elements of 6 different brigades) would square off against Union troops from three different Corps for control of these normally serene 20 acres. The ground would change hands 6 times. Over 6,000 casualties would be suffered by both sides in the process.

Ultimately, the Wheatfield proved to be a no-man’s land. As the fighting there cooled-down just after 7:30pm, the Confederates controlled the field, but could not advance any farther.

The part of Sickles‘ III Corps line that is farthest to the south is held by the brigade of Brig. General J.H.H. Ward. His left flank is resting on the end of Houck’s Ridge, at a unique rock formation known to locals as “The Devil’s Den“.

There are several stories about how this name came to be. One such story is about a large snake (so large that it was named “The Devil”) that had at one time made the area its home. Snakes aside, the place is full of dark crevices and caves between the rocks, and its size makes it somewhat forboding. You can see it being the kind of place that the Devil himself might feel at-home in.

The name of this place would take on a new meaning with the brutal fighting that would begin there right about now, 150 years ago.

Hood’s division would attack this area, by brigades, “en echelon”. There is some debate as to whether this move was brilliant, or an accident of mis-communication. Essentially, each of Hood’s four brigades would attack one at a time, from right to left along his front. His right-most brigades, commanded by Brig. General Evander Law and Brig. General Jerome Robertson, respectively, would take part in the attack on Little Round Top in a few minutes. His other two brigades, under Brig. General Henry Benning and Brig. General George Anderson, would assault Devil’s Den, and the Wheatfield, respectively.

Because of the way Devil’s Den extends a little farther south than other locations on the field, Ward’s and Benning’s men would start this fight, and it was extremely bloody combat. Within the first few minutes, Hood himself was wounded in the arm, and command of the division fell to Brig. General Law – a fact that led to communication problems and tactical uncertainty on the Confederate side.

The Union men held the good, high ground, but there weren’t enough of them to do it effectively. Capt. Smith, commanding the 4th New York Independent Battery had 4 of his 6 guns on the ridge to provide artillery support, and the other 2 (along with the men of the 4th Maine Infantry) were tucked behind, facing south to blast away at any Confederates attempting a flanking movement around the end of the ridge. Surprisingly, the position held for nearly an hour before being overwhelmed and flanked.

When the Confederates took Devil’s Den, it turned into a platform for sniping at officers on Little Round Top, and they were able to do quite a bit of damage that way, but they couldn’t convert it into further gains. The western slope of Little Round Top proved to be too difficult to assault directly.

It would take Lt. General Longstreet’s Corps over 3 hours to travel the 4 miles between General Lee’s headquarters and the point where their attack would begin. They ended up marching much farther than 4 miles.

Longstreet was not especially excited about his chances for success, so that certainly may have been a factor. The main issue was the lack of a route to the southern end of the field that had been properly scouted.

Taking the most direct route down Seminary Ridge, Longstreet’s men were under the cover of trees and thus concealed from Union eyes. About half-way down though, they came to a clearing that would expose their movement. That obviously couldn’t happen, as the element of surprise was important. Longstreet made the decision to turn his men around and head back up the ridge to the north, cut farther to the west, and hope to find a route behind the ridges that would keep him hidden.

All of this marching and countermarching added a significant amount of time and distance to the move. All of the men, but especially Evander Law’s brigade – who had been marching all day, since about 3:30am – were becoming more fatigued.

By this time, 150 years ago, the two divisions of Longstreet’s Corps that will make the attack today are in position. Within a few minutes, they will step out to confront the over-extended line of Maj. General Dan Sickles’ III Corps.

From Little Round Top, a scared group of Union signalmen, and Maj. General Gouverneur Warren – sent to find a vantage point from which he could see the whole of Sickles’ position – observes the Confederates moving into line of battle to the southwest. Riders are immediately sent out to find someone – anyone – who can occupy that hill.

His long misadventure finally at a close, J.E.B. Stuart arrived at General Lee’s headquarters outside Gettysburg 150 years ago right now.

Though there had been cavalry with Lee during the entire campaign, Stuart took the best of the Confederate cavalrymen with him, leaving the Army of Northern Virginia in a precarious position. He would be chastised by Lee in private, but neither man left a record of the details of the conversation, so we don’t know how stern the talking-to was.

It must not have been too bad, because Stuart maintained his command, though he and his men would be of little use for the rest of the battle.

While Lt. General James Longstreet lost the argument that morning about whether to attempt an attack on the Union left, he at least insisted that the attack wait until all of the men of McLaws’ and Hood’s divisions arrived. The stragglers at the end of the column were the men of Brig. General Evander Law’s Alabama brigade.

150 years ago right now, Law’s men came off the road and were ready for combat. Now, Longstreet could finally start his march to the south, and get his Corps in position for the attack that General Lee wanted.

And the longer Longstreet waits, the more Union troops are coming off the road and strengthening their line.

This thing would be easier said than done.

Maj. General Dan Sickles had been confused and upset all morning. He had been ordered to hold a position with his III Corps along Cemetery Ridge, on the left flank of the Union army.

The problem was that this wasn’t especially good ground. There was a patch of woods directly in front of him that made detecting an approaching enemy difficult, and made deploying artillery nearly impossible. Beyond the woods, there was a stretch of higher ground where a Peach Orchard was located. Sickles feared that he could be easily dominated if enemy troops took position there.

He desperately wanted to move. He had begged all morning for someone from headquarters to come take a look at this area with him. General Meade was too busy. General Warren couldn’t be sparred. Finally, General Hunt – the Chief of Artillery – went to inspect the left flank.

Hunt agreed with Sickles that the Peach Orchard would make for a good artillery platform (at least better than the position the III Corps currently held). Hunt was careful to point out that he wasn’t authorized to order such a move, though – Sickles would still need to talk to General Meade. If Hunt were going to make the move, he’d want to be sure that the woods over on Seminary Ridge were clear first.

Sickles thought that was a good idea, and 150 years ago right now he sent a party of sharpshooters led by Col. Hiram Berdan into those woods to check things out. It didn’t take long for them to run into (and exchange a few shots with) troops from Brig. General Cadmus Wilcox’s brigade, who were at that point the right flank of the Confederate army.

When word of this encounter got back to Sickles, he knew that he had no choice but to move his men forward to meet the threat.

Standing on Seminary Ridge 150 years ago right now, Lee devises his plan for the day’s fighting.

Lt. General Longstreet’s Corps hasn’t gotten into the battle yet. It’s just coming off the road. Two of his divisions will participate today. The third, under Maj. General George Pickett, is too far away to be of use.

Lee want’s Longstreet’s men to attack the Union left. This area was scouted by some of Lee’s aides overnight and found to be vulnerable. This attack was to be  coordinated with Lt. General Ewell, who will attack the Union right at the same time – to prevent the Yankees from shifting their troops to meet Longstreet’s threat.

With his most trusted subordinate leading the attack, Lee is confident of success. Longstreet isn’t so sure, and spends the morning arguing for a move around the Union left, placing the Confederate army on ground that they chose in between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, DC. In that scenario, the Federals would be forced to attack the Confederates, and would be at a disadvantage.

Lee would hear nothing of it. They had beaten the enemy yesterday, and they would do it again today. Today, it would be Lee’s way.

After getting all the orders straight with his subordinates, and riding through the night, General Meade finally arrived to survey the position Hancock and Howard had laid out on Cemetery Hill, 150 years ago right now.

For better or worse, the fight would be made here.